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Introduction :  
 
It is now widely accepted that investment in technology, innovation and research is a 
crucial factor in economic growth. But curiously, the relevant level of governance of 
these investments and their positive externalities remains at the national level, in 
spite of the internationalization of technologies and companies. Consequently, the 
concept of a National Innovation System (Sharif, 2006) remains operative to a certain 
extent, especially in France where the colbertist system was dominant. H. Etzkowitz 
and al. (1998) confirms that “a complex web of relationship has grown up between 
academics, university originated start-ups and larger firms”. In the French case, the 
analysis suggests two major hypotheses: first, the military public market explained 
the existence of national triple helix (Serfati, 2007) and secondly, the academic 
institutions specialized in research and education had some preferences on local or 
national firms. Nowadays, P. Papon (1998) explains that the French research system 
is deeply involved in the crisis of the nation state, that cannot longer pilot 
technological and scientific development as it was the case in the decades following 
the Second World War.  
 
In our communication, we would like to complete this analysis with the data base on 
industrial contracts signed by the CNRS (French National Center for Scientific 
Research). We test this assumption of “national” border that can be viewed as an 
intense concentration of contracts for some national “champions”. Our working 
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material is the data base of the contracts of the units of the CNRS with economic 
partners, that has been collecting information since 19861. The fact of having a base 
(40 000 contracts) going from 1983 to 2006 offers the possibility to consider different 
periods for the analysis of the evolution of these contracts during 20 years, and 
specifically the evolution2 of labs’ and firms’ distribution. In this way, statistics and 
graphic software for social networks will be used for the quantitative approach.  
 
Two objectives will guide the statistical study: first, highlighting the principal 
characteristics (evolution of the number of contracts, representation of different 
subjects, distribution of the sectors, geographical localization of the partners, 
concentration of the partnerships, etc) according to a relevant “periodization” and, 
second, to use the techniques of representation of the networks (Ucinet and Pajek) to 
illustrate the durability of the contracts and fidelity of the partnerships. As for the 
second case, the objective is to test the contribution of the sociometric approaches in 
the understanding of the resilient phenomena, like relationships between academic 
firms and institutions. These results will be explained and commented with the 
expertise on relationship between science and industry accumulated by M.P. Bès in 
previous studies, focused on engineering sciences3. 
 
In the first part, we underline the intense concentration of the CNRS contracts 
considering the level of actors’ behaviour. In this section, we present our data with 
some descriptive statistics highlighted by other studies focused on research 
partnerships. Secondly, we present the application of Social Network method to our 
data, in order to complete the precedent analysis by observation and analysis of 
network forms. It allows explaining the question of concentration and fidelity in 
partnership. In the end of the communication and with the former results, we discuss 
again the old notion of scientific community (Crane, 1972) revisited with the social 
networks approach.   
                                                 
1  This work would not be possible without the help from the CNRS service in charge in industrial 
relations, thanks to the different managers.  
2  Of course, any longitudinal method contains problems in selection, follow-up and choice of coherent 
data. We choose to explain, at each step of this research, our criteria in selection.  
3  - M-P. Bès & M. Grossetti, “Creative knowledge environments between individual and organisation 
levels”, 4th Triple Helix Conference, Copenhagen, Denmark – Lund, Sweden, November 6th-9th 2002. 
 - M-P. Bès & M. Grossetti, "Collaboration trajectories between CNRS research laboratories in 
Engineering Sciences and firms : genesis and evolution, Paper presented to the European Association for 
Evolutionary Political Economy Conference, November 2-5, Berlin, 2000. 
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I.  Research Partnerships for CNRS labs 
 
I.1. Research Method and Data  
 
Our working material is the data base of contracts of CNRS (French National Center 
for Scientific Research) signed by the different units (labs in the text) and 
implemented by the legal service in each CNRS regional delegation. For 
everycontract, we have got some quantitative information (numerous of lab in CNRS 
classification, date, duration, numerous of French department for the labs’ and firms’ 
location) and qualitative data (lab name, contract title, firm name). In previous 
studies, the liability of this database was soon demonstrated (Grossetti & Bès, 
Grossetti & Nguyen). This tool cannot be used to establish a technological survey or 
to follow a scientific trajectory by firm, domain or activity because of our involvements 
to respect confidential informations. Of course, it will be possible to follow the 
successive contracts signed by a firm with CNRS units and so to understand the 
major strategic technological areas. Here, all investigations are conducted in a global 
analysis of the French research system and without name of organizations.  
  
Let us underline the difference with studies based on publications or patents: they 
have only a view on the results of cooperation and scientific alliance and 
underestimate the whole aspects of research partnerships: exchange in human 
resources, dissemination in ideas, methods and materials, experimental aspect in 
science, and so on. These are all the aspects of cooperation between several actors 
invested in research, which do not lead to direct results as publications or patents.  A 
data base of research contracts is a better tool to understand the research networks 
and especially, to observe the network evolution and the behaviour of incoming and 
outgoing actors.  
 
I.2. Available data about contracts of CNRS labs 
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After a long task4 focused on cleaning, normalizing and collecting useful5 data, we 
obtained a data base, involving 26028 contracts between CNRS units and firms, for 
the period (1986-2000) informed about the following characteristics: the name of 
research unit, its location (12 areas), the leader’s name, the scientific domain 
(classified into 8 departments), the firm’s identity, its location, the starting date of the 
contract, the duration done by number of months. Moreover, we coded the economic 
activity of the firms, with the INSEE nomenclature in 31 different sectors. Table 1 
summarizes the descriptive statistics of this set of contracts:  
 
Table 1. descriptive statistics of the CNRS contracts 1986-2000 
Number of contracts 26024 
Number of firms  3642 
Number of scientific labs 1680 
Average  number of contracts per firm 7 
Average  number of contracts per lab 15 
Average  duration of a contract 20 months 
 
Even if the number of firms is twice than the number of labs, it is the inverse 
phenomena in terms of average per kind of partner:  there are twice more contracts 
by lab than by firm. It seems that for a scientific team, it’s a normal activity to have 
some partnership with firms: it allows increasing the global financial amounts for the 
laboratory, to finance some investments in high equipment, to finance PhD thesis but 
also to work on real and applicative subjects and to compare several applications. 
For a firm, the activities related to innovation, knowledge propriety, intellectual rights, 
and R&D alliances are more strategic and depend on several factors as the 
complementarities between internal and outsourcing research.  
 
By the study of duration, let us remark that the majority of the contracts (96%) last for 
less than 3 years, and that 73% covers a period of 3 years, which is the duration for a 
PhD thesis. The involvement of PhD students is an important characteristics of  
                                                 
4  We have benefit from the help of Adrien Defossez, a Master Student in economy, which conducts this 
part with serious and method. Thanks for his help.  
5  The major difficulty was to manage the evolution of organizations : creation and disappearance of labs 
and firms, fusions and acquisitions, new classification in scientific domain, etc.  
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research contracts, because of the mobility of the student and of his capability to 
maintain ties between the two partners (Bès, 2004).  
 
We have also to underline that the CNRS (French Center of Scientific Research) 
does not cover all the scientific fields while two others National Centers are focused 
on medical research (INSERM) and agricultural and agronomics field (INRA). That 
explains the weak representation of biotechnology or chemistry firms in our data 
base and of course, the importance of Engineering sciences. Indeed, in the following 
graphic, it’s possible to read the distribution of contracts per scientific domains, 
defined by the CNRS as scientific department.  
 
Graph 1. Number of contracts per CNRS scientific department  
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In many contracts, the main scientific domains are engineering sciences and 
chemistry, which are the most representative areas to the trend of “commercialization 
of science” (Malissard, P., Gingras, Y. & Gemme, B., 2003 ; Powell & Owen-Smith, 
2004). In these disciplines, patents, start-up and co-publications have increased very 
fast since the 1980’s years, after the Bay Dohle Act’s effect in the United States and 
then, in other developed countries. In our case, 4 scientific domains (life sciences, 
mathematics and physics, engineering sciences, chemistry) cover more precisely the 
main CNRS contracts (93%) in which the last two share 56% of contracts. In addition, 
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this distribution remains constant over time. The life sciences represent only 17% of 
the contracts due to the presence of INSERM specialized in this scientific field.   
 
Considering the evolution of number of contracts, we obtain the following graphic.  
 
Graph. 2. Evolution in number of contracts during the period 1986-2000 
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As we can see in this graphic, the number of contracts increased strongly during this 
period, from 600/year to more than 3500/year in 2000. It is possible to identify three 
successive periods: during the first period (1986-1991) the number of contracts is 
stable around 710/year, during the second period (1992-1997) the number of 
contracts grows from 31.2% per year, then a third period (1998-2000) in which the 
growth rate is even higher (47%/year).   
 
However this graphic does not integrate the duration of each contract and represents 
only the number of contracts without distinction between long and very short 
relationship.   
 
In our purpose, an interesting question is to question if this increase is due to the 
reinforcement of the contractual activities of any partners (firms or labs) or due to the 
appearance of new comers in this science market. It will be interesting to observe the 
contractual activity of the major firms. 
 
I.3. Concentration 
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In the following graphic, we report the number of labs per number of contracts. It 
underlines the extreme “concentration”: few labs sign the majority of contracts. The 
old “Merton” effect, which designs the star system in science, appears also in our 
study, focused on research contracts with economic partners.  
 
Graphic 3 : Distribution of CNRS units per number of contracts during (1986-2000) 
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This fact is confirmed by a more precise table, in which we precise the number of 
labs associated to the percentage of contracts.   
 
Table 2 : Distribution of labs per number of contracts 
Number of contracts  Number of labs Share of contracts 
between 173 and 409 
contracts 11 10% 
more than 169 contracts 32 20% 
more than 44 contracts 153 50% 
more than 14 contracts 468 80% 
 
The most important lab in terms of contract has signed 409 contracts with economic 
partners. 10% of the contracts is concentrated between just 11 labs, 50% of the 
contracts is concentrated between 153 labs each holding more than 44 contracts. 
Among the 20 first units, 10 are working in Chemistry and 10 in Engineering 
Sciences. Only 3 out of 20 are located in the region “Ile de France” and two regions 
gather 10 of these labs.  
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Graphic 4: Distribution of economic partners per number of contracts during (1986-
2000) 
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The concentration among the economic partners is more intense whereas the “first” 
has signed 891 contracts with the CNRS. The 10 first firms gather 18% of the 
contracts with research units. Among the 20 first, that is to say 26.2% of the activity, 
we find initially the European Commission, then the Public Corporations (2030 
contracts) and finally, two enterprises present in chemical and oil sectors.   
 
Table 3: Distribution of contracts per activity sector 
Activity sector number of contracts  Share 
Industry 11004 42% 
Public 8367 32% 
Service 6410 25% 
Other 216 1% 
Agriculture 27 0% 
Total 26024 1 
 
The industrial sector gathers 42% of the CNRS contractual activity but the public 
Administration (public authorities, Ministries, Public corporations,  European 
Commission) has also many contracts with the CNRS (32%).  
 
There is an intense concentration in this data base, characterized by the presence of 
some labs specialized in Engineering Sciences, located in Province, engaged in 
some contracts with a public industrial firm.  
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This concentration does not provide information on neither the centrality of the actors 
nor their positioning in the partnership chain: the largest could be on the edge of the 
partnership network. In the second part we will observe more closely the evolution of 
the general structure of research networks selected according to various criteria. The 
point is to link the theme of concentration to that centrality. 
 
II. Social Networks in Research Partnerships 
 
We found in the literature focused on R&D cooperation some stylized facts, in 
relation with our questions about concentration, centrality and existence of some 
leaders or intermediate actors. The major characteristics are the following:  
• Proximity effects: we know that there are more contracts between two partners 
located in the same area than between the other. See Saxenian for the Silicon Valley 
or Grossetti & Bès, for the Engineering Sciences.   
• Social embeddedness: Through the analysis of around one hundred joint 
research contracts established between CNRS laboratories and firms during the 
period from 1960 to 2000, we (Grossetti & Bès, 2001) have shown the important role 
of social relations (44 %) in making contacts between partners.   
• Trust and path dependency: the importance of the phenomena of loyalty and 
mutual confidence between partners in the coordination of contracts is mentioned in 
several studies (Joly & Mangematin, 1996)  
• The informal transfer of ideas and technology through the professional mobility 
and the human contacts is one of interesting results of STS (Science and Technology 
Studies) for the social network approach: the information circulate between the 
relationships.  
• R&D accords, technology agreements take organizational forms different from 
integration or from market exchanges: temporary, flexible, with trust and social 
aspects: Powell (1990) spoke about network. 
• Research partnerships provoke different kinds of apprenticeship based on the 
externalities as, knowledge about a specific technology, a mastery of technical 
instruments, a scientific methodology or about one specific industrial market (Bès, 
2007).  
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All these results underline the embeddedness of economic and social features in the 
dynamic of market science: every contract is the result of a series of personal 
relations and of strategic involvements (Grossetti & Bès, 2001).   
 
In this second part, we test the capacity of social network methods to explain the 
partnership’s evolution between research public teams and firms in the French case 
over the period 1986-2005. By building different networks (networks of firms, 
networks of scientific teams) and calculating some structural parameters (density, 
network centralization, connectivity, path length, etc.) we are able to observe the 
major changes in collaborations in different periods. In the first section, we built 
several research networks of some major French firms and comment the results. In 
the second section, we built successive networks of one scientific domain and test 
the “small world” hypothesis.  
 
II.1. The “research network” of major firms 
 
We have selected the 40 major French firms with a criterium of French stock market 
index, done in July 20076 and we have searched systematically their name in the 
database. This method allows following the same sample during several periods. In 
the other hand, it eliminates all firms, which have undergone important change in 
their shareholding and which have been disappearing from the financial top 
classification.    
 
These “CAC  40” major French firms, represent 20% of the contracts in the data 
base.  20% is underestimated by the method of data processing, it doesn’t depend 
on the strength of ties (duration of contract for example). If it includes an indicator of 
strength (number of months) the former number will probably double. The pertinence 
comes from the criteria in financial investments realized by the major firms. 
 
                                                 
6  The CAC 40, which takes its name from Paris Bourse's early automation system (Continuous Assisted 
Quotation), is a French stock market index, which integrates the financial value of the 40 first firms. The index 
represents a capitalization-weighted measure of the 40 most significant values among the 100 highest market 
caps on the Paris Bourse. 
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We transformed the data done in a table by a matrix in which the lines represent the 
labs and the columns represent the firms. The software Ucinet has got a visual 
representation of the relationship between the major firms and the labs.  
 
Graph 5 : First Network labs-CAC40 firms7, 1988-1990 
 
 
  
This network presents a center which is a firm specialized in electricity and eight 
“cliques” in considering the number of labs in relation between several firms and the 
leader. Every clique is structured by 2 or 3 firms. 4 sectors are distant from the center 
and few related to the other organizations. The pharmacy sector has a particular 
position: away from the center but with as intense research activity. No lab is related 
to more than 3 major firms and 75% of them are related to only one firm.  
 
                                                 
7  To respect the confidential information, we chosen to present the enterprises by their activity sector.  
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Graph 6: Second Network public labs-CAC40 firms, 1993-1995 
 
 
  
There is an increase of the density with always Electricite 1 as the network center, 
which concentrates, like in this first period, 30% of this network ties. The “second 
knives” are now often directly connected to the network center and there are 3 firms 
out of the main network. The number of labs increases from 141 to 269 and any of 
them work from now on with 4 or 5 major firms. In the same period, the number of 
labs increases from 18 to 21.  
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Graph 7: Network public labs-CAC40 firms, 1998-2000 
  
 
 
It is easy to observe the increase of the network density and at the same time, the 
increase in the number of ties. The share of labs with only one tie with the major firms 
has decreased during the successive periods: it begins with 75% at the first period 
and drops to 69% at the second period to 67% for the last one. The center and the 
“second knives” reinforce also their position. The average distance between two firms 
has decreased as if the dissemination of information is getting better in time.  
 
With this type of graphic, the first economic comment concerns the increase of 
research activity due to the major French firms, in terms of number of contracts and 
number of partners, in a context of competition and innovation. Although it’s well 
known that the French financial investment in research is lower than that from other 
foreign companies, the trend between 1988 and 2000 is the reinforcement of 
relationship with CNRS units. The second comment concerns the increasement if ties 
between all the actors (that is the density) which can be interpreted as a 
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standardization in the strategy of scientific research: all firms are related to the same 
labs and none is very specific in terms of technological exploration.   
 
Let us consider now the dissemination of ideas, materials and personal through firms 
and labs, as some economists underline the transfer of know-how between rivals 
(Von Hippel, 1987 ; Bozeman & Mangematin, 2004).  On the lab's side, it well-know 
that, in spite of property rights, externalities of knowledge exist in the industrial 
relationship (Bès, 2007).   
 
II.2. Scientific networks  
 
Here, we test the hypothesis of “small world” presented in the literature focused on 
innovation as the specific general structure of social networks. The “small worlds” 
networks are inbetween regular networks - where each member is connected with his 
neighbour - and random graphs in which the distances between two unspecified 
members are very short. In fact, in a “small world” network, the actors are able to 
take a smaller route (a short cut) to create a relation with another actor. Some 
networks of innovators are “scale-free” (Barabasi & alii, 2002) as in biotechnology 
(Gay & Doucet, 2005) but many of these networks look like “small worlds” (Watts, 
1998) as in scientific collaboration (Newman, 2001). For R. Cowan, (2004), the “small 
world” is the best structure for innovation while the random graphs are significant in 
the process of diffusion.  
 
In this literature, we find several criteria used to prove the existence of a “small 
world”: the criteria of high clustering coefficient, a law average geodesic length, that 
increases slowly with the diameter. However these criteria (high degree of clustering 
and weak path length) are not always sufficient to prove the existence of these types 
of networks and we prefer to choose three criteria: a decreasing line in log-log 
degree distribution, an average short path length, a high connectivity degree. In this 
case, the question is, specifically, not to obtain exactly these criteria but to observe a 
trend towards the “small world” structure.   
 
 II.2.1. Process of building firms networks in a scientific domain 
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Now, the questions were how to observe the evolution of forms in the network of 
firms and labs and to explain the diffusion of information, ideas, scientific results and 
methods trough the actors involved in a research activity.  In following the literature 
focused on scientific diffusion, it’s easy to underline the existence of communities 
structured by the scientific disciplines (Mullins, 1972 ; Amin & Cohendet, 2006), in 
which the institutions are stable and the diffusion of information is free. Even if the 
frontiers of an epistemic community are not stable and last for ever, we use the 
CNRS classification separating into several departments (8) to distinguish the 
different scientific disciplines. We choose then to select the Chemistry department, to 
draw the networks for two periods and to calculate the “small worlds” indicators.   
 
The drawing process of the Ucinet Network begins with the building of appropriate 
matrix labs-labs: it’s the product between the matrix labs-firms done by the table in 
the CNRS data base and its directly transposed to a matrix. This labs-labs network 
doesn’t represent the firms, which are necessary in the background. Every tie 
between two labs represents the existence of k contracts signed by these two labs 
with these same k firms.  
 
As this network involves two different actors (economic partners and research units 
called labs), it contains two dimensions, related to two sorts of social ties: direct ties 
between two partners (contracts) and indirect ties (through the same partner). It isn’t 
a network in terms of a homogeneous social tie between the actors but, it can be 
viewed as a “meta-network”, a community of experts in which some information are 
disseminated.  
 
II.2.2. Example of successive networks  
 
In the same method used early, we selected two periods (1988-1990) and (1998-
2000) and built the matrix and the network associated, in using Ucinet software. For 
a correct visualization, the two graphs 8 and 9 involve only the levels superior to 28. 
                                                 
8 For the first graph, The whole graph involves 3164 ties and 142 labs whereas this one presents only 84 
relations for which the number of ties is superior to 2, i.e. 25 labs (17%).   
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The hypothesis of “small world” or “scale free” has to be tested with the smoothing of 
degree distribution, as mentioned in the graph 10.  
Graph 8: Simplified Chemistry/1st Network, 1988-1990 
 
Graph 9:  Simplified Chemistry/2nd Network, 1998-
2000 
  
Table 4: indicators about Chemistry 1st network 
“1988-1990” 
Table 5: indicators about Chemistry 1st network “1998-
2000” 
Number of actors  142 
Number of components 1 
Size of the major component 128 
Number of isolated components 14 
Number of ties 3164 
Clustering coefficient 1.178 
Average path length 1.978 
Connection degree > 2 
density 0.158  
Number of actors  247 
Number of components 2 
Size of the major component 225 
Number of isolated components 20 
Number of ties 7568 
Clustering coefficient 1.162 
Average path length 2.153 
Connection degree > 2 
Density 0.125  
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Graph 10 : log-log Plot of degree distribution 
1988-1990 Smoothing 1988-1990 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1998-2000 Smoothing 1998-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here, we obtain two decreasing curves that reinforce the existence of criteria 
obtained in “scale free networks”. There are a lot of labs with a weak connection 
degree and few individuals with a high connection degree, called hubs. Let us notice 
that the two incline coefficients are smaller (-0.58 for the first and -0.54 for the 
second) than in the literature (-3). This fact comes perhaps from the “small world” 
effects, which involve a high clustering coefficient: there are also some “hubs” around 
a lot of individuals slightly connected but also, any individuals intermediate, with a 
number of relations. In fact, the previous results, presented in the tables 4 and 5, get 
the profile of “small world” network: two weak densities, two clustering coefficients, 
and two short average path lengths. Moreover, in the time, the linear smoothing is 
better as if we have got a trend to “worldation”. 
 
In the other scientific areas - except in the Nuclear and Physics department -, the 
same indicators give us some comparable results, that is a weak density around 0.2, 
a clustering coefficient superior than 1 and an average path length near to 2.  
 
Results and Conclusion:  
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This first application of Network methods and tools to the CNRS contracts allows us 
to obtain some results: at first, the major firms’s scientific network is not “scale-free” 
as if competition and strategy between the most large firms dominate the behaviour 
in R&D investments and management of contracts with public research units. 
However, in second part, we demonstrate that every discipline network is a “small 
world”, i.e., that it exists several scientific communities in which the diffusion of 
information is free and easy, even if its forwards through any actors (some labs or 
some firms). Probably, there are several “small worlds” in this database as in the 
scientific collaboration networks. Is seems that the industrial research does not 
disturb too much the properties of scientific network, as it’s well known in the 
literature of Sciences Studies (Merton, Mullins, Crane, for example). 
 
As perspective in this work, we will continue the analysis of the Network evolution 
(observation of individual positions) in two directions: the first theoretical perspective 
is to highlight the differences between physical networks (data processing or 
electronic network) and social networks (contract networks, social exchange 
networks, etc.). What does represent a “meta” network with two dimensions and two 
types of ties? While the second perspective of this work is to reinforce this 
preliminary study in the question of concentration: Do the “hub” actors reinforce their 
positions in the network?  How to introduce the “small” firms? -, and the question of 
fidelity : how many contracts repeat in time? is there a structural or individual fidelity?  
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